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Capacity of Cooperative Fusion in the Presence of
Byzantine Sensors
Oliver Kosut and Lang Tong, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract— The problem of cooperative fusion in the presence
of Byzantine sensors is considered. An information theoretic
formulation is used to characterize the Shannon capacity of
sensor fusion. It is shown that when less than half of the sensors
are Byzantine, the effect of Byzantine attack can be entirely
mitigated, and the fusion capacity is identical to that when all
sensors are honest. But when at least half of the sensors are
Byzantine, they can completely defeat the sensor fusion so that
no information can be transmitted reliably. A capacity achieving
transmit-then-verify strategy is proposed for the case that less
than half of the sensors are Byzantine, and its error probability
and coding rate is analyzed by using a Markov decision process
modeling of the transmission protocol.
Index Terms— Sensor Fusion, Byzantine Attack, Shannon Ca-
pacity, Network Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks are not physically secure;they are vulnerable to various attacks. For example,
sensors may be captured and analyzed such that the attacker
gains inside information about the communication scheme and
networking protocols. The attacker can then reprogram the
compromised sensors and use them to launch the so-called
Byzantine attack. This paper presents an information theoretic
approach to sensor fusion in the presence of Byzantine sensors.
A. Cooperative Sensor Fusion
We consider the problem of cooperative sensor fusion as
illustrated in Fig. 1 where the fusion center extracts informa-
tion from a sensor field. By cooperative fusion we mean that
sensors first reach a consensus among themselves about the
fusion message. They then deliver the agreed message to the
fusion center collaboratively. We will not be concerned with
how sensors reach consensus in this paper; see e.g., [1]. We
focus instead on achieving the maximum rate of sensor fusion.
The sensor fusion problem is trivial if the consensus is
perfect, i.e., all the sensors agree on the same fusion message.
If the fusion center can only communicate with one sensor
at a time, and there is no limit on how many times a sensor
can transmit (i.e., no energy constraints), there is no differ-
ence between having a single sensor delivering the message
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Fig. 1. Cooperative sensor fusion in the presence of Byzantine sensors.
and having any number of sensors transmitting the message
collaboratively. The capacity of such an ideal fusion is given
by the classical Shannon theory
C = max
p(x)
I(X ;Y ) (1)
where X is the transmitted symbol by a sensor, Y the
received symbol, and p(x) the distribution used to generate
the codebook. Also for this case, even if there is a feedback
channel from the fusion center to sensors, the capacity does
not increase [2].
Cooperative fusion becomes important if consensus cannot
be reached, i.e., there is a probability β > 0 that a particular
sensor is misinformed about what message to transmit. Thus
there is a positive probability that a particular sensor communi-
cating with the fusion center is delivering the wrong message.
It is no longer obvious what the capacity of sensor fusion
is. In [3], a number of sensor fusion models are considered,
and the fusion capacity is obtained for several cases. Most
relevant to this paper is the fusion model in which there is a
feedback channel from the fusion center to individual sensors,
and the fusion center polls specific sensors for transmissions.
Optimized among all polling strategies, it is shown that, for
any β < 1, the fusion capacity is also given by C in (1). The
strategy given in [3] can be characterized as “identify-then-
transmit” by first using an asymptotically negligible number
of transmissions to identify a sensor that is correctly informed
then letting that sensor transmit the entire codeword.
2B. Byzantine Attack and Related Work
The problem considered in this paper is when a fraction β
of sensors are Byzantine sensors. The goal of these Byzantine
sensors is to disrupt the sensor fusion collaboratively.
We assume that Byzantine sensors have full knowledge
of the system and impose no restriction on what they can
transmit. In particular, Byzantine sensors know the transmis-
sion strategy including the codebook and the polling strategy
of the fusion center. They also know, of course, the correct
fusion message. Unlike the misinformed sensors that transmit
randomly selected messages in [3], Byzantine sensors can be
malicious sometimes and behave in other times as honest
sensors in order to evade detection by the fusion center.
Furthermore, they can coordinate among themselves (unknown
to both the honest sensors and the fusion center) to launch the
so-called Byzantine attack. As a result, the capacity achieving
coding and transmission strategies developed in [3] are no
longer applicable.
The notion of Byzantine attack has its root in the Byzantine
generals problem [4], [5] in which a clique of traitorous
generals conspire to prevent loyal generals to form consensus.
It was shown in [4] that consensus in the presence of Byzantine
attack is possible if and only if less than 13 of the generals are
traitorous. Relaxing the strict definition of consensus of [4],
Pfitzmann and Waidner uses an information theoretic approach
to show that Byzantine general problem can be solved for
an arbitrarily large fraction of Byzantine nodes [6]. These
and other Byzantine consensus results [1] are relevant to the
current paper only in that they deal with the consensus process
prior to sensor fusion.
Countering Byzantine attacks in communication networks
has also been studied in the past by many authors. See the
earlier work of Perlman [7] and also more recent review
[8], [9]. An information theoretic network coding approach
to Byzantine attack is presented in [10]. Karlof and Wagner
[11] consider routing security in wireless sensor networks.
They introduce different kinds of attacks and analyze security
risks of all major existing sensor network routing protocols.
Countermeasures and design considerations for secure rout-
ing in sensor networks are also discussed. It is shown that
cryptography alone is not enough; careful protocol design is
necessary.
There has been limited attempt in dealing with Byzantine
attacks for sensor fusion. The problem of optimal Byzantine
attack of sensor fusion for distributed detection is considered
in [12] where the authors show that exponentially decaying
detection error probabilities can still be maintained if and
only if the fraction of Byzantine sensors is less than half.
A witness-based approach to sensor fusion is proposed by Du
et. al. [13] where the fusion center and a set of witnesses
jointly authenticate the fusion data by the use of the Message
Authentication Code. The authors of [13] are concerned with
the trustworthiness of the fusion center. In contrast, we address
the problem of sensor fusion with malicious sensors attacking
the fusion center from within.
C. Main Result and Organization
The main result of this paper is to show that, if polling of
the fusion center is allowed, and the polling is perfect, the
capacity of sensor fusion in the presence of Byzantine attack
is again C in (1) when β < 12 and 0 when β ≥ 12 .
The converse of the result holds trivially for β < 12 because
the capacity of the sensor fusion in the absence of Byzantine
sensors is C. For β ≥ 12 , we show that it is possible for the
Byzantine sensors to completely defeat the fusion center and
honest sensors by setting things up so that exactly half the
sensors act honestly with the true message and the other half
also act honestly but with a false message. It is thus impossible
for the fusion center to distinguish the set transmitting the true
message from the set transmitting the false one, so it cannot
decode the true message with probability more than 12 .
To show the achievability for β < 12 , we propose a transmis-
sion and coding strategy different from that for misinformed
sensors [3], for which the capacity achieving strategy can be
called “identify-then-transmit”, where the fusion center first
identifies an honest sensor, then receives the entire message
from that sensor. Here we must deal with the situation in
which a Byzantine sensor may pretend to be an honest sensor.
The key idea is one of “transmit-then-verify”. Specifically, we
first commit a sensor (Byzantine or honest) to transmit part
of a codeword and then verify if the sensor is trustworthy.
After a sensor has transmitted, the fusion center verifies the
transmission using a random binning procedure. Under this
procedure, a Byzantine sensor either has to act honestly or
reveal with high probability its identity. We then have to show
that the overhead in the verification diminishes as the length
of the codeword increases.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
models for sensors, communication channels, and network
setup. The main result is given and sketch of proofs are
presented in Section III. We conclude in Section IV.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
A. Fusion Network and Communication Channels
A sensor is Byzantine if it can behave arbitrarily. A sensor is
honest if it behaves only according to the specified protocol.
Let β be the probability that a randomly selected sensor is
Byzantine. With probably 1− β, a randomly chosen sensor is
honest. We assume that the sensor network is large in the sense
that there are an infinite number of elements. This assumption
ensures that the probability of all nodes being Byzantine is
zero.
Sensors can communicate with the fusion center directly,
and the transmissions are time slotted. We assume that the
uplink channel from each sensor to the fusion center is a
Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) {X ,Y, q(y|x)} where
X is the input alphabet, Y the output alphabet, and q(y|x)
the transition probability of the channel. The assumption of
identical channel is restrictive and synchronization difficult
when the network is large and the fusion center stationary. The
assumed model is reasonable, however, if the fusion center is
a mobile access point that can travel around the network, and
3a sensor only transmits to the fusion center when it is activated
by and synchronized to the fusion center.
We assume that there is a polling channel from the fusion
center to each sensor. Since the fusion center is not power
limited, we assume the polling channel is error free with
infinite capacity.
B. Transmission Protocol
Before sensor fusion starts, we assume that the sensor
network, without error, has agreed upon a fusion message
W ∈ {1, · · · ,M} that is uniformly distributed. The code is
in general variable length and dynamically generated, so there
is no single fixed codebook. However, we assume that the
sensors may have any number of fixed codebooks to use as
pieces of the code.
The fusion center polls one node to transmit one symbol
at each time slot. At time t, the fusion center polls node Kt
to transmit a symbol Xt. The symbol received by the fusion
center is then Yt. The fusion center may choose Kt based on
previously received symbols Y t−1 and polling history Kt−1.
Since the polling channel has infinite capacity, Kt may choose
Xt based on all symbols previously received by the fusion
center Y t−1, the polling history Kt−1, and anything else the
fusion center chooses to send to it. It may also base Xt on all
previous transmissions that it has made itself, but not those
made by other sensors, and of course the message W .
If a sensor is Byzantine, it may also base its choice of Xt
on all transmitted symbols, including those sent by honest
sensors, and any additional information the fusion center sends
to any sensor. We also assume that the Byzantine sensors know
the algorithm the fusion center and honest sensors are using,
and that they may communicate securely among themselves
with zero error.
After the fusion center receives Yt, it decides whether to
continue polling based on Y t and Kt. If it decides to continue,
then it moves on to the next time slot t + 1 and starts the
polling step again. Otherwise, it decodes based on collected
observations.
C. Achievable Rates and Capacity
Let N be the random variable representing the total number
of symbols sent in a coding session. Once the fusion center
decides it is done polling, it decodes the global message based
on Y N and KN . The decoded message is denoted by Wˆ ∈
{1, · · · ,M}. A decoding error occurs if Wˆ 6= W .
The rate of a code is defined as
R ,
log(M)
E(N)
,
where M is the number of messages and E(N) is the expected
number of symbols transmitted during a coding session. The
probability of error is defined as Pe , Pr(Wˆ 6= W ), where
W is the message, uniformly selected from {1, · · · ,M}, and
Wˆ is the decoded message. Pe will in general depend on the
actions of the Byzantine sensors. A rate R is called achievable
if for any given error ǫ > 0 and any choice of actions by the
Byzantine sensors, there exists a code with rate larger than
R− ǫ and probability of error less than ǫ. The capacity of this
system is defined as the maximum of all achievable rates.
III. FUSION CAPACITY
The main result of this paper is given by the following
theorem that characterizes the capacity for the fusion network
described in Sec II.
Theorem: The capacity of this system is
Cbyz =
{
C, if β < 1/2
0, if β ≥ 1/2
where C is defined in (1).
A sketch of the proof of this theorem follows. In Subsec-
tion III-A, we prove the converse. In Subsection III-B, we
describe the coding strategy used to prove achievability. In
Subsection III-C, we define some error events and discuss the
error probability. Finally, in Subsection III-D, we discuss the
rate of this coding scheme.
A. Converse
Suppose that β = 0 and that all the sensors may com-
municate with each other with zero error. Certainly these
assumptions cannot decrease the capacity for any β. Since
the sensors can communicate with each other, we can think
of the entire sensor network as a single encoder for the DMC
with perfect feedback, since the sensors are allowed to know
all previously received symbols by the fusion center. Thus
under these assumptions this system reduces to a point-to-
point DMC with perfect feedback. In that system, the feedback
does not increase capacity [2], so the capacity is C. Thus, the
capacity of the sensor network with Byzantine sensors cannot
have capacity greater than this, so Cbyz ≤ C for all β.
Next we show that if β ≥ 12 , then C
byz = 0. To do this, we
will show that for any algorithm to be used by the fusion center
and honest sensors, the Byzantine sensors will be able to make
it impossible for the probability of error to be made arbitrarily
small. The scheme performed by the Byzantine sensors to
accomplish this is as follows. They divide themselves into
two groups, one with 12 of the sensors, and one with β −
1
2
of the sensors. The sensors in the latter group act exactly like
honest sensors. Since there is no way for the honest sensors
to know anything that the Byzantine sensors do not, it will be
impossible to distinguish an honest sensor from a Byzantine
sensor acting honestly. The sensors in the former group also
act exactly like honest sensors, but with a message different
from the true one. Thus exactly half of the sensors—the honest
sensors plus the Byzantine sensors that act honestly—will act
honestly with the true message. The other half of the sensors—
the rest of the Byzantine sensors—also act honestly but with
an incorrect message. Thus, since the number of sensors in
these two groups is the same, no matter what the fusion center
does, it will not be able to determine which half is reporting
the true message and which half is reporting the false one, so
it will not be able to decode the true message with probability
greater than 12 . Therefore the converse of the theorem holds.
4B. Coding Strategy
To prove the direct part of the theorem, we first describe the
coding strategy that will achieve this rate. The coding scheme
can be described as a “transmit-then-verify” procedure. In
other words, first we ask a sensor to send part of the message
to the fusion center. After that, the fusion center polls other
sensors to verify whether the received information is correct.
Thus, if a Byzantine sensor is selected to transmit the message,
it can send erroneous information, but then with high proba-
bility it will be discovered to be erroneous in the “verify” step.
The Byzantine sensor can send the true information, but then it
will be verified, so the fusion center now has that information,
and knows it to be correct. As long as the fusion center always
verifies any information it receives, the Byzantine sensors can
never get any false information through. The best they can do
is to prolong the coding process, but we will show that this
additional overhead can be made to be negligible.
The coding strategy is as follows. We first break the message
up into v chunks, such that each chunk contains an equal part
of the information in the message, and the message will be
perfectly reconstructible given all the chunks. These chunks
could be, for example, the v digits representing the message
W when it is written as a number in a particular base. The
fusion center will try to obtain the v chunks one at time, and
verify that each chunk obtained is from an honest transmission.
Next we describe the two codebooks to be used in the
uplink transmission over the DMC q(y|x). Take any ǫ > 0
and R < C. Let the number of possible messages M = 2nR,
so that the message set is {1, · · · , 2nR} and the set of all
possible chunks is {1, · · · , 2nR/v}. The first codebook G1 is
a (2nR/v, n/v, ǫ) code to transmit the chunk, where (M,n, ǫ)
represents a code over the DMC with M messages, n channel
uses, and probability of error less than ǫ. When a sensor
is requested to transmit, say, the ith chunk of the message,
an honest sensor will use G1 to transmit the ith chunk. A
Byzantine sensor can choose to act honestly and use G1 to
transmit the correct chunk, or it can transmit any other signal.
The second codebook G2 is a (j, l, ǫ) code used by the
sensor in the verification process. Specifically, to verify if a
transmission represents correct information, the fusion center
uses a random binning technique. It distributes all possible
chunks into j bins and broadcasts the bin index of each
possible chunk to the sensors. The fusion center then asks k
sensors to transmit the bin index of the particular chunk that
the fusion center is verifying. An honest sensor will transmit
the bin index to the fusion center using this second codebook
G2. For fixed j, the code length l is chosen sufficiently long
for transmitting the bin index accurately over the DMC. A
Byzantine sensor, if requested for the index, again can transmit
arbitrarily including acting honestly by using G2 to transmit the
correct index. The numbers j and k are functions of decoding
error ǫ and are chosen sufficiently large to ensure the fidelity
of verification but not large enough to penalize the rate. We
comment on the selection of them in Section III-C.
The detailed transmission protocol is as follows.
0) The fusion center randomly selects a sensor to transmit
the next chunk (starting at the first chunk).
1) If the selected sensor is honest, it transmits the entire
chunk using the codebook G1. (If the selected sensor is
Byzantine, it can act arbitrarily).
2) The fusion center randomly places each element in the
set of all possible chunks into one of j bins. The fusion
center randomly selects k sensors, and sends the binning
to each of them. Each of those k sensors then sends the
bin index of the chunk back to the fusion center using
code G2.
3) If more than half of the k received bin indices match the
bin index of the chunk that was received in step (1), the
fusion center accepts that chunk. Otherwise it declines
it.
4) If the chunk was accepted, the fusion center keeps the
same sensor selected and moves on to the next chunk (go
to step 1). If it was declined. the fusion center randomly
selects a new sensor and tries again with the same chunk
(step 0).
5) Polling stops when all chunks have been received and
accepted. To complete the coding process, the fusion
center extracts the original message from the v accepted
chunks.
Note that each time we run through steps (1) through (4), we
use the channel n/v + kl times.
In step (2), we have used a random binning procedure. This
is different from the way such a procedure is often used, in
which it is done just once during the construction of the code,
but then the codebook is fixed. Here, we actually construct an
entirely new random binning every time we do step (2). This
is necessary because if we used some fixed or deterministic
binning, then if a Byzantine sensor is selected to transmit
a chunk in step (1), it would know the binning to be used
beforehand, so it could find a chunk in the same bin as the
real chunk, which would make the verification useless. The
probability that the Byzantine sensor selects a chunk different
from the real chunk but in the same bin must be small, so we
need dynamic random binning.
C. Error Events and Error Probability Analysis
We show next that, with appropriately chosen n, v, j, l, k in
the two codebooks, the probability that a message is decoded
incorrectly goes to zero, and the decoding process will end
with an average number of transmissions approximately n +
O(ǫn). Thus with a message set of size 2nR, and R ≥ C − ǫ,
we have the proof of the main theorem.
To analyze the probability of error, we need to define some
events. Events A1,A2,A3 are the most basic ways in which
errors can occur. B1,B2,C have to do with the conclusion the
fusion center reaches, and thus determine how the coding will
progress.
• A1: A coding error occurs in step (1), i.e., the transmitted
chunk is different from the decoded one.
• A2: Of the k bin indices that are decoded in step (2), less
than half of them equal the bin index for the true chunk.
• A3: For a given pair of distinct chunks, they are both put
into the same bin in step (2).
• B1: The chunk is declined in step (3).
5• B2: A chunk is accepted in step (3) and that chunk is not
the true one.
• C: The true chunk is transmitted in step (1).
The following lemma bounds the probabilities of events
relevant to the error analysis.
Lemma 1: Define
p1
∆
= Pr(B1|C), p2
∆
= Pr(B2|C
c),
p3
∆
= Pr(B2|C).
For sufficiently large j and k, and no matter what the Byzan-
tine sensors do, Pr(Ai) ≤ ǫ for i = 1, 2, 3, and
p1 ≤ Pr(A1) + Pr(A2), p2 ≤ Pr(A2) + Pr(A3),
p3 ≤ Pr(A1)(Pr(A2) + Pr(A3)).
Proof: Since G1 was constructed to have error probability
less that ǫ, Pr(A1) ≤ ǫ.
Now we show Pr(A2) ≤ ǫ for sufficiently large k. Consider
one of the k sensors polled in step (2). It will be honest and a
G2 error will not occur when it sends its bin index in step (2)
with probability (1−β)(1−ǫ). These two events are sufficient
(though not necessary) for the decoded bin index to be the real
one. Therefore the probability that the decoded bin index is
the real one is at least (1 − β)(1 − ǫ), so the probability that
the decoded bin index is not the true one is no more than α ,
1−(1−β)(1−ǫ). Thus the number of decoded bin indices that
are incorrect will be upper bounded by a binomial distribution
with each one having probability α of being incorrect. Since
β < 1/2, for sufficiently small ǫ, α < 1/2, so we will assume
that this is the case. Thus
Pr(A2) ≤
k∑
i=k/2
(
k
i
)
αi(1− α)k−i
≤
(
k
k/2
)
(1− α)k
k∑
i=k/2
(
α
1− α
)i
(2)
=
1− α
1− 2α
(
k
k/2
)(
αk/2(1 − α)k/2 − αk+1
)
≤
1− α
1− 2α
4k/2αk/2(1 − α)k/2 (3)
where (2) holds because (ki) ≤ ( kk/2) for all i ∈ {0, · · · , k},
and (3) holds because α < 1/2, so the denominator 1 − 2α
is positive, so the −αk+1 term can be dropped, and because(
2m
m
)
≤ 4m for all m. Thus if
k ≥ 2
log
(
1−2α
1−α ǫ
)
log(4α(1− α))
,
then Pr(A2) ≤ ǫ.
Next we show Pr(A3) ≤ ǫ for sufficiently large j. Since
there are j bins, the probability that two different chunks are
put into the same bin in step (2) is 1/j. Thus if j ≥ 1/ǫ,
Pr(A3) ≤ ǫ.
Note that p1 is the probability that the received chunk is
declined in step (3) given the true chunk was transmitted in
step (1). One way for this to happen is for there to be a coding
error in step (1), i.e., A1 occurs, so the received chunk will not
be the true chunk, so the polled sensors may not confirm it.
Note that a coding error does not necessitate the chunk being
declined, but it does cover a large set of the ways it could
happen. If A1 does not occur, then the received chunk is the
true one, so the chunk could only be declined if the majority
of the bin indices received in step (2) do not match the true
chunk, i.e., A2 occurs. Thus
p1 ≤ Pr(A1 ∪A2) ≤ Pr(A1) + Pr(A2).
Next, p2 is the probability that an incorrect chunk is ac-
cepted given that an incorrect chunk is transmitted in step (1).
If more than half of the decoded bin indices are incorrect (A2),
then those incorrect bin indices might confirm the incorrect
chunk. If not, then the only way for the incorrect chunk to be
accepted is for it to fall into the same bin as the true chunk
(A3). Thus
p2 ≤ Pr(A2 ∪A3) ≤ Pr(A2) + Pr(A3).
Finally, p3 is the probability that an incorrect chunk is
accepted given that the correct chunk is transmitted in step (1).
In order for this to happen, the decoded chunk must not be
the true one, so a coding error must occur (A1). In addition,
for that decoded incorrect chunk to be accepted, more than
half of the decoded bin indices must be incorrect (A2) or the
incorrect chunk must fall into the same category as the real
one (A3). Thus
p3 ≤ Pr(A1) Pr(A2 ∪A3) ≤ Pr(A1)(Pr(A2) + Pr(A3)).
As the coding scheme commences, it moves through a
number of different states, depending on the number chunks
the fusion center has received thus far, and whether the
selected sensor is Byzantine. Depending on the exact sequence
of events, the fusion center might remain at a certain state for
some time, requesting the same chunk several times until it
finds an honest sensor. The progress is probabilistic because
every time the fusion center selects a sensor it might be
Byzantine or honest, and every time it receives a transmission,
a transmission error might or might not occur. In fact, the
progress of the coding scheme can be modeled as a Markov
process. In particular, it will be a Markov decision process,
because a Byzantine sensor, if it is selected to transmit a
chunk, has some choice about what to transmit. That choice
will influence the probabilities of future events. The Markov
decision process that we will use to analyze the error proba-
bility of this scheme is diagrammed in Fig. 2.
The process will have 2v+3 states. State i, for i = 0, · · · , v
represents the fusion center having successfully received i true
chunks and the currently selected sensor is honest. State i′ is
the same except the currently selected sensor is Byzantine.
Finally, state e represents the fusion center having accepted at
least one false chunk. The decision for the Markov decision
process will be whether a Byzantine sensor, if it is asked to
send a chunk in step (1), chooses to send the true chunk or not.
Thus a decision will only be made when a Byzantine sensor
has been selected, i.e., we are in one of the i′ states.
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Fig. 2. The Markov decision process used to find the error probability. Dashed
lines from a state represent the Byzantine sensor choosing to send erroneous
information, and dotted lines represent the Byzantine sensor choosing to send
true information.
States v, v′, and e will be terminal states, so an error will
occur if we reach state e before state v or v′. Define
ei
∆
= Pr(error occurs starting from state i),
e′i
∆
= Pr(error occurs starting from state i′).
In executing the Markov decision process, the Byzantine
sensors make decisions to maximize the probability of error.
At the very beginning of the coding scheme, we select a sensor
which will be with probability 1−β honest and probability β
Byzantine. Thus, the total probability of error is
Pe = (1− β)e0 + βe
′
0.
From state i, with probability p1 the chunk will be declined.
The fusion center then selects a new sensor, which will be
Byzantine with probability β and honest with probability 1−β.
Thus we transition to state i′ with probability p1β and back
to state i with probability p1(1 − β). With probability p3, an
incorrect chunk is accepted, so we transition to state e. Finally,
with probability 1−p1−p3 the true chunk is accepted, so we
transition to state i+ 1.
From state i′, the transition probabilities depend on the
decision. If the Byzantine sensor chooses not to send the
true chunk, then with probability p2 the false chunk will be
accepted, so we transition to state e. Otherwise, the fusion
center selects a new sensor. Thus with probability (1 − p2)β
we return to state i′, and with probability (1− p2)(1− β) we
transition to state i. If the Byzantine sensor decides to send
the true chunk, then the transition probabilities are essentially
the same as they were from state i; with probability p1β we
return to state i′, with probability p1(1 − β) we transition to
state i, with probability p3 we transition to state e, and with
probability 1− p1 − p3 we transition to state i+ 1′.
From these transition probabilities, we see that
ei = p3 + (1 − p1 − p3)ei+1 + p1βe
′
i + p1(1 − β)ei,
e′i = max{p2 + (1 − p2)βe
′
i + (1− p2)(1 − β)ei,
p3 + (1 − p1 − p3)e
′
i+1 + p1βe
′
i
+ p1(1 − β)ei}.
The maximum represents the Byzantine sensors always mak-
ing the decision that maximizes the error probabilities. In
addition, if we arrive at either state v or v′, the fusion center
has received the entire message without error, so ev = e′v = 0.
D. Code Rate
We also need to consider the rate of this code. To show that
the rate can be made arbitrarily close to C, we need to show
that the expected number of channel uses E(N) converges to
n as ǫ goes to zero. Each time a chunk is transmitted (i.e.,
each time we run through steps (1) to (4)), the channel is
used n/v + kl times. All we need to know is the expected
number of chunks that are transmitted in the entire coding
scheme. To find this, we will use a similar Markov decision
process as the one described above. The only differences lie in
the fact that we are not interested in whether an error occurs,
only in how long it takes to finish. Thus we remove state
e and redefine states i and i′ to represent the fusion center
having accepted i states, but with all of them not necessarily
correct. Thus every time we would transition to state e, we
actually transition somewhere else. For instance, if we are in
state i′ and the Byzantine sensors choose to send erroneous
information, then with probability p2, the chunk is accepted,
so we transition to state i+1′ instead of e. Let qi and q′i be the
expected number of steps made in the Markov decision process
before reaching one of the terminal states (v or v′) given that
we start at state i or i′ respectively and the Byzantine sensors
make decisions that maximize the expected number of steps.
Then
qi = 1 + (1 − p1)qi+1 + p1βq
′
i + p1(1− β)qi,
q′i = max{1 + p2q
′
i+1 + (1− p2)βq
′
i
+ (1 − p2)(1− β)qi,
1 + (1 − p1)q
′
i+1 + p1βq
′
i + p1(1− β)qi}.
(4)
Again, qv = q′v = 0.
Lemma 2 (Average Code Length): There exist n, v, j, and
k as functions of ǫ such that the error probability Pe → 0 and
the expected number of channel uses E(N) → n as ǫ→ 0.
Proof: Take j and k large enough for Lemma 1 to hold,
and n and v such that
2
ǫ
≥ v ≥
1
ǫ
, n ≥
klv
ǫ
. (5)
7We define fi, f ′i for i = 0, · · · , v as follows. Let fv , f ′v ,
0 and for i < v,
fi , p3 + (1− p1 − p3)fi+1 + p1βf
′
i + p1(1− β)fi, (6)
f ′i,a , p2 + βf
′
i + (1− β)fi, (7)
f ′i,b , p3 + (1− p1 − p3)f
′
i+1 + p1βf
′
i , (8)
f ′i , max{f
′
i,a, f
′
i,b}. (9)
The only difference between fi, f ′i and ei, e′i is that the (1−p2)
factors have been dropped from the second two terms in (7).
Thus ei ≤ fi, e′i ≤ f ′i , for all i. Fix some i ∈ {0, · · · , v − 1}.
If f ′i = f ′i,a, then by (7)
f ′i =
p2
1− β
+ fi. (10)
Combining this with (6) gives
fi = fi+1 +
p3
1− p1
+
p1p2β
(1− p1)(1 − β)
, (11)
which with (10) produces
f ′i = fi+1 +
p3
1− p1
+
p1p2β
(1− p1)(1 − β)
+
p2
1− β
= fi+1 +
p3
1− p1
+
p2(1− p1(1− β))
(1 − p1)(1− β)
. (12)
If f ′i = fi,b, then combining (6) with (8) gives
f ′i =
p3
1− p1
+ p1(1− β)fi+1 + (1− p1(1− β))f
′
i+1. (13)
Note that (12) and (13) are what f ′i would be if f ′i equaled
f ′i,a or f
′
i,b respectively. However, these expressions are not
necessarily equal to f ′i,a and f ′i,b, because we have used (6)
to derive both of them, which contains the real value of f ′i .
Still, because of the definition of f ′i in (9), the larger of (12)
and (13) will be the true value of f ′i .
We will now show by induction that f ′i = f ′i,a for i =
0, · · · , v− 1. For i = v− 1, since fv = f ′v = 0, it is clear that
the expression in (12) is larger than that in (13), so f ′v−1 =
f ′v−1,a. Now we assume that f ′i+1 = f ′i+1,a and show that
f ′i = f
′
i,a. By (10),
f ′i+1 =
p2
1− β
+ fi+1.
Thus, if f ′i = f ′i,b, (13) becomes
f ′i =
p3
1− p1
+ p1(1− β)fi+1
+(1− p1(1 − β))
(
p2
1− β
+ fi+1
)
=
p3
1− p1
+ fi+1 +
p2(1− p1(1− β))
1− β
.
Since the expression in (12) is larger than this, f ′i = f ′i,a.
Therefore (11) holds for i = 0, · · · , v − 1, so
fi =
(
p3
1− p1
+
p1p2β
(1− p1)(1 − β)
)
(v − i). (14)
Thus
Pe = (1− β)e0 + βe
′
0
≤ (1− β)f0 + βf
′
0
= f0 +
p2β
1− β
(15)
=
p1p2β + p3(1− β)
(1 − p1)(1− β)
v +
p2β
1− β
(16)
≤
4ǫ2β + 2ǫ2(1 − β)
(1− 2ǫ)(1− β)
(
2
ǫ
)
+
2ǫβ
1− β
(17)
=
(
8β + 4(1− β)
(1− 2ǫ)(1− β)
+
2β
1− β
)
ǫ
where (15) is from (10), (16) is from (14), and (17) is from
Lemma 1 and (5). Thus Pe → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
Now we analyze qi, q′i to find E(N). Combining the expres-
sion for qi in (4) with either expression for q′i in the maximum
in (4) yields expressions of the form
qi = 1 + γ + δqi+1 + (1− δ)q
′
i+1, (18)
q′i = 1 + γ
′ + δ′qi+1 + (1− δ
′)q′i+1, (19)
where γ, γ′ ≥ 0 and δ, δ′ ∈ [0, 1]. The quantity γ represents
the expected number of state transitions between states i and
i′ before moving on to state i+1 or i+1′, given that we start
at state i′, and δ represents the probability that when we do
transition away from states i and i′, we go to state i+ 1 and
not i+1′. The quantities γ′ and δ′ are the same except starting
at state i′. Obviously, the values of these will depend on which
element of the maximum is larger, but for our current purposes
it only matters that the expressions will have this form.
We will now show by induction that qi − qi+1 ≥ 1 and
q′i − q
′
i+1 ≥ 1 for i = 0, · · · , v − 1. First consider i = v − 1.
qv = q
′
v = 0, so by (18) and (19), qv−1 = 1 + γ and q′v−1 =
1 + γ′. Thus qv−1 − qv ≥ 1 and q′v−1 − q′v ≥ 1. Now we
assume that qi+1 − qi+2 ≥ 1 and q′i+1 − q′i+2 ≥ 1 and show
that qi−qi+1 ≥ 1 and q′i−q′i+1 ≥ 1. By assumption and (18),
qi − qi+1 = δ(qi+1 − qi+2) + (1− δ)(q
′
i+1 − q
′
i+2)
≥ δ + (1− δ)
= 1.
Similarly by (19),
q′i − q
′
i+1 = δ
′(qi+1 − qi+2) + (1− δ
′)(q′i+1 − q
′
i+2)
≥ δ′ + (1− δ′)
= 1.
Thus qi − qi+1 ≥ 1 and q′i − q′i+1 ≥ 1 for i = 0, · · · , v − 1.
In particular, q′i+1 ≤ q′i − 1.
Suppose the first element of the maximum is larger in (4).
Then
q′i = 1 + p2q
′
i+1 + (1− p2)βq
′
i + (1 − p2)(1− β)qi
≤ 1 + p2(q
′
i − 1) + (1− p2)βq
′
i + (1− p2)(1 − β)qi.
This can be rewritten
q′i ≤
1
1− β
+ qi. (20)
8Now suppose the second element of the maximum is larger in
(4). Then
q′i = 1 + (1− p1)q
′
i+1 + p1βq
′
i + p1(1 − β)qi
≤ 1 + (1− p1)(q
′
i − 1) + p1βq
′
i + p1(1− β)qi.
This can also be rewritten to (20), so (20) must hold no matter
which value is larger in the maximum in (4). Thus
qi ≤ 1 + (1− p1)qi+1 + p1β
(
1
1− β
+ qi
)
+ p1(1− β)qi.
This can be rewritten
qi ≤ 1 +
p1
(1− p1)(1 − β)
+ qi+1,
so
qi ≤
(
1 +
p1
(1− p1)(1 − β)
)
(v − i). (21)
Let V be the random variable denoting the total number of
chunks that are requested in the entire coding session. Since
we start at state 0 with probability 1− β and at state 0′ with
probability β,
E(V ) = (1 − β)q0 + βq
′
0
≤ q0 +
β
1− β
(22)
≤
(
1 +
p1
(1 − p1)(1− β)
)
v +
β
1− β
(23)
where (22) is from (20) and (23) is from (21). Thus
E(N) = E(V )
(n
v
+ kl
)
≤
[(
1 +
p1
(1− p1)(1− β)
)
v +
β
1− β
] (n
v
+ kl
)
= n
[
1 +
p1
(1− p1)(1 − β)
+
β
1− β
1
v
+
(
1 +
p1
(1− p1)(1 − β)
)
klv
n
+
β
1− β
kl
n
]
≤ n
[
1 +
2ǫ
(1− 2ǫ)(1− β)
+
β
1− β
ǫ
+
(
1 +
2ǫ
(1− 2ǫ)(1− β)
)
ǫ+
β
1− β
ǫ2
]
(24)
= n
[
1 +
(
2(1 + ǫ)
(1 − 2ǫ)(1− β)
+
β(1 + ǫ)
1− β
+ 1
)
ǫ
]
where (24) is from Lemma 1 and (5). Thus E(N) → n as
ǫ→ 0.
Therefore the rate of this code,
nR
E(N)
,
converges to R as ǫ goes to 0. Thus C is achievable.
IV. CONCLUSION
We showed in this paper that, by cooperative sensor fusion,
the presence of Byzantine sensors can be completely mitigated
when the Byzantine sensor population is less than half of the
total number of sensors, but no information can be transmitted
when at least half of the sensors are Byzantine. We proposed a
“transmit-then-verify” scheme that forces a Byzantine sensor
to either act honestly or reveal its Byzantine identity. The key
of this idea is the use of random binning in sensor polling.
Note that the random binning in our strategy is not a random
coding argument; it is an actual randomized transmission
protocol.
Several simple generalizations can be made. The network
does not have to contain infinite number of sensors. For a finite
size network, we will assume that a deterministic β fraction of
the sensors are Byzantine. In that case, all the sensors can be
polled when verifying a transmission. Thus if less than half of
the sensors are Byzantine, information will always be correctly
verified. This requires a constant and hence asymptotically
negligible number of channel uses, so polling every sensor
instead of a random subset does not effect the rate. We can also
relax the assumption that the consensus is perfect by assuming
that there is a fraction of sensors that are are misinformed as in
[3]. In such a circumstance, a similar coding algorithm as the
one described in this paper can be used, and the full channel
capacity can be achieved as long as the correctly informed
honest sensors outnumber the Byzantine sensors, though the
proof of this is nontrivial.
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